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Sarbanes–Oxley compliance requirements have forced firms to look at their use of spreadsheets in financial reporting. They
are finding that they have many spreadsheets and that testing and other formal development disciplines are rare. The literature
on spreadsheet errors has shown that without strong controls, most spreadsheets will have material errors; this means that
firms that use uncontrolled spreadsheets cannot plausibly claim to be in compliance with Sarbanes–Oxley. This paper looks
at a promising control discipline for bringing spreadsheets into Sarbanes–Oxley compliance, namely logic inspection testing
following the traditional Fagan (1976) methodology created for software testing.
Keywords
Spreadsheet, testing, code inspection, logic inspection, Sarbanes–Oxley, compliance, end user computing, human error, error
detection.
INTRODUCTION: THE SPREADSHEET CHALLENGE FOR SARBANES–OXLEY COMPLIANCE
In 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which requires strong new corporate controls over financial
reporting. Although this was not the first compliance regulation, it drew special attention because it affects all public firms
and because it directly affects the chief executive office (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) in each firm.
Sarbanes–Oxley requires each firm to assess whether its financial reporting system was effectively controlled during each
major reporting period. In addition, an independent auditing firm must concur with or refute this assessment. The requirement
for effective control is extremely strict. A firm may not assess its financial reporting system as well controlled if there was
even a single material weakness in its financial reporting control system.
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) sets requirements for auditing companies. According to the
PCAOB (PCAOB 2004), “a material weakness is a significant deficiency or combination of significant deficiencies that
result in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be
prevented or detected.” Note that Sarbanes–Oxley punishes the possibility of errors, not just actual errors. The threshold for a
material error, furthermore, usually is a mere five percent (Vorhies 2005). Under Sarbanes–Oxley, there is almost no margin
for control weaknesses.
Failing to effectively control financial reporting can be very costly. Glass, Lewis & Company analyzed 899 cases in which
firms reported material weaknesses (Durfee 2005). They discovered that companies experienced an average stock price drop
of 4% after an announcement of a material control weakness. In turn, the Dutch research firm ARC Morgan found that in
more  than  60% of  all  cases  of  material  weakness  reports  in  2004,  the  chief  financial  officer  (CFO) was  gone  within  three
months (Durfee 2005)
In response to corporate concerns about Sarbanes–Oxley, research and consulting firms conducted several surveys of how
companies actually do financial reporting. What they discovered was spreadsheets— large numbers of spreadsheets. All of
these surveys found that at least 80% of all firms were using spreadsheets in financial reporting (www.coda.com,
RevenueRecognition.com 2004, Durfee 2004, TMCnet.com 2004, Panko 2006d). Furthermore, when companies use
spreadsheets for financial reporting, they often use many. Several firms interviewed informally by the author at a conference
on compliance indicated that they used manually operated webs of at least 100 spreadsheets to implement their financial
reporting processed. Even firms that use Hyperion or other dedicated financial reporting programs tend to use quite a few
spreadsheets and to use them in the riskiest parts of the process, such as end of period adjustments (Debreceny 2005).
Prompted by concerns about liabilities arising from spreadsheets, some companies turned to the research on spreadsheet
errors. What they found was extremely troubling. Human error research has shown that human cognition invariably leads to
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errors in all cognitive activities (Reason 1990). For cognitive activities of any complexity, such as programming, error rates
are inevitably about 2% to 5% (Panko 2006a). (A good example is programming, in which errors (faults) are measured on a
per-line of code basis.) Laboratory research has confirmed that similar per-formula error rates exist in spreadsheet
development (Panko 2006b), and so have many inspections of real-world operational spreadsheets (Panko 2006c). In large
spreadsheets with dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of root (non-copied) formulas, error is inevitable. Inspections of more
than 80 operational spreadsheets since 1995 found errors in 94%, despite the fact that most inspections only reported
significant errors (Panko 2006c).
How bad are spreadsheet errors? Panko (2006b) interviewed two principals of spreadsheet auditing practices in the United
Kingdom, where some spreadsheets must be audited by law. They independently gave data indicating that about 5% of all
spreadsheets they audit contain what one of the interviewees called “show stopper” errors. Many more spreadsheets contain
smaller but still damaging errors. For example, KPMG (1998) only reported spreadsheets to be incorrect if they contained
errors that would make a difference to decision makers. Ninety-one percent of the spreadsheets they examined had errors that
large. In turn, a Coopers and Lybrand (1997) study did not report an error unless there was at least a 5% error in a bottom line
value. That study found such errors in 91% of all spreadsheets. Recall that five percent it the typical threshold for material
errors.
Coopers and Lybrand (1997) did not report an error unless there was at least a 5% error in a bottom line
value. That study found such errors in 91% of all spreadsheets. Recall that five percent it the typical
threshold for material errors.
Although most first-round Sarbanes-Oxley audits usually focused only on the most glaring control weaknesses, a number of
firms did report material deficiencies related to spreadsheets. In 2005, RSM McGladrey examined Securities and Exchange
Commission filings and reported that “numerous” companies had already reported control deficiencies due to spreadsheets
(Kelly 2005). Future Sarbanes-Oxley audits are likely to be much more rigorous and so are likely to find many more
problems.
Given evidence that most spreadsheets probably contain material errors, it is difficult for any company that uses spreadsheets
extensively to claim that it does not have to report a material control weakness. Given the widespread use of spreadsheets in
financial reporting, it would appear that few firms today can claim that their financial reporting systems are effectively
controlled.
Given evidence that most spreadsheets probably contain material errors, it is difficult for any company that
uses spreadsheets extensively to claim that it does not have to report a material control weakness. Given the
widespread use of spreadsheets in financial reporting, it would appear that few firms today can claim that
their financial reporting systems are effectively controlled.
DEALING WITH SPREADSHEETS
There also is a body of research on what companies are doing to control their spreadsheets— or, more correctly, what
companies are not doing. Surveys have been done on corporate spreadsheet policies and development practices since 1987
(Panko 2006c). All, without exception, have found that few companies have development policies. Furthermore, nearly all
developers follow highly risky development practices, including rarely doing comprehensive testing. Spreadsheet
development today appears to be where software development was in the 1950s and 1960s.
It seems obvious that better spreadsheet development will be needed to control the use of spreadsheets in Sarbanes–Oxley
compliance. Improvements in all phases of the spreadsheet development life cycle will be necessary. These improvements
probably can draw from many of the lessons of software engineering, although this is conjecture at this point.  Research is
badly needed to see how effective various software engineering techniques could be in spreadsheet development. Although a
good deal of advice has been written about how to reduce spreadsheet error, few of these prescriptions have been shown to be
“safe and effective” on the basis of research. Furthermore, given the paucity of spreadsheet development controls in
corporations today, neither experience nor best practices are likely to be good guidelines for improving controls.
This paper focus on a single critical element in spreadsheet development, namely testing. In software development, testing
consumes a substantial fraction of all development resources. In a sample of 84 software development projects in 27
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organizations, Jones (1998) found that the amount of time spent in testing to reduce errors ranged from 27% to 34%,
depending on program complexity. In every case, subjects reported that the project allocated insufficient time for testing (p.
139). In another study, Kimberland (2004) found that Microsoft software development teams spent 40% to 60% of their total
working time in testing. We must expect similar resource requirements in spreadsheet inspection
Before testing, programs typically have errors in 2% to 5% of all lines of code (Panko 2006a). After several rounds of testing
(unit testing, integration testing, etc.), this error rate falls to about 0.1% to 0.3% (Putnam & Myers 1992). In software
development, testing is the primary key to error control, and it seems reasonable to expect this to be the case in spreadsheet
development as well
Unfortunately, the most widely cited recommendation on spreadsheet controls for Sarbanes-Oxley compliance
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2004) lists logic inspection as a control but places this protection tenth on a list of twelve controls.
Furthermore, the framework gives almost no information on testing. In fact, its advice on logic inspection— that logic
inspection should be done by a single person— flies in the face of what software developers have long known about logic
inspection— that a single inspector will not find a high percentage of all errors. This inability of single testers to find a large
percentage of errors also has been replicated in spreadsheet inspection experiments (Galletta et al. 1993, 1997; Panko, 1999).
Fagan (1976) first argued that multi-person code inspection is needed, and subsequent experiments and corporate experience
have confirmed this repeatedly
Given the need for controls in spreadsheet development, the likely importance of testing, and the dearth of information in this
area, the remainder of this paper will assess the likely usefulness of common testing methods employed in software
development. It will focus on one especially promising spreadsheet testing approach that has already begun to be explored
somewhat in empirical spreadsheet research. This is logic inspection, which in software development is called code
inspection.
TYPES OF TESTING
As noted earlier, testing is not widespread in corporate spreadsheet development. This makes practice-based suggestions
about spreadsheet testing highly suspect. In fact, we know that developers are extremely overconfident in the accuracy of
their spreadsheets (Panko 2006d) and feel that little testing is necessary. Consequently, they tend to think that superficial
testing approaches are acceptable.
Testing in the Systems Development Life Cycle
Every recommended practice about software development makes testing an important activity. However, testing is not a
separate stage from code development. Rather, code development and testing are intertwined. In fact, the development of
testing plans normally occurs before code development even begins.
During code development, there usually are several phases of testing. For instance, software should be developed in small
modules of about 100 to 400 lines of code. Each module should be tested thoroughly. This should be followed by several
stages of integration testing, as the program is progressively assembled into larger units.
One type of testing during and after code development is regression testing. Whenever changes are made in a program,
regression testing reruns some or all earlier tests to ensure that changes have not created new problems.
Eyeballing
Perhaps the most widely used “testing” approach is to look the results over for reasonableness. This is known as eyeballing. It
is a good starting point, but it is wrong to expect much from this approach. Rickets (1990) and Klein, Goodhue, and Davis
(1997) have shown that people are not good at seeing even large errors. In compliance, even errors too small to be obvious
with eyeballing can cause serious problems. Overall, eyeballing seems is a good beginning step in inspecting a spreadsheet,
but it is only that.
Auditing
In the financial accounting literature, auditing means examining a process. Auditors sample only parts of the process to assess
if the process appears to be well controlled. While spot-checking is efficient and usually is sufficient for a global assessment
of control, it does not catch all or even most errors in the process being audited. In spreadsheet auditing, some analysts
propose examining only the risky parts of spreadsheets. While such parts of spreadsheets certainly should be examined
especially closely, there are many types of errors in spreadsheet development, and they certainly do not occur only or even
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primarily in risky parts of the spreadsheet. For compliance, cost control in error reduction is not a goal. Compliance requires
the strongest possible error reduction effort.
Execution Testing
In execution testing, the tester enters input numbers into a module and determines whether the module produces the correct
output results. In software development, execution testing is so widespread that it is often seen as synonymous with the word
“testing.”
Unfortunately, execution testing is very difficult to do without training. Spreadsheet recommendations often speak vaguely
about “trying extreme values.” However, software testers need weeks of training to learn how to pick test values. They need
to know about equivalence classes, code coverage, the need to choose values that should actually break the code, and many
other seemingly arcane matters. Without sophistication in the selection of test cases, execution testing has limited value.
In addition, execution testing requires an oracle— a way of determining if a case is correct. In software development, a failure
to execute a feature may be the oracle. For spreadsheet development, crashes are rare, so the oracle normally must be some
way to tell which of the dozens of tests done on a module is correct. Such oracles rarely exist apart from the spreadsheet
calculations themselves.
Another problem is technology. Execution testing in software development can only be done on modules because there are
too many input–output permutations for effective execution testing. In software development, usually there are automated
ways to input test cases and inspect the results. In spreadsheet development, such technology does not exist. Spreadsheet
execution testing for a module needs to input numbers into all input cells, overwriting formulas. If these formulas are not
changed back after testing, the spreadsheet will be incorrect in all subsequent uses.
Overall, execution testing seems to be most appropriate for regression testing where past results known to be correct (or at
least well-tested). Even then, it will be difficult to apply.
Logic Inspection
Another testing technique used for software development is code inspection, in which a group of programmers independently
examines a module of code line by line, looking for problems.
While execution testing is very difficult for untrained personnel, code inspection’s simplicity makes it a good potential
candidate for end users. In fact, there have been three experiments in spreadsheet logic inspection using inspectors with little
training (Galletta et al. 1993, 1997, Panko 1999). Individual inspectors found about 40% to 60% of pre-seeded errors in these
inspections. This is about as good as professional programmers do in code inspection.
Logic Inspection Methods
Given the potential for logic inspection for testing, we will look at hypotheses for how logic inspection probably should be
done in spreadsheet testing, based on how code inspection has worked in programming and on a few logic inspection
experiments on spreadsheets.
Reasonable Expectations
First, it seems important to have reasonable expectations. Many articles about reducing spreadsheet errors talk about
eliminating errors. However, testing never eliminates errors in software development or any other aspect of life, such as
grammar or spelling (Panko 2006a). Typically, a round of code inspection is likely to eliminate 60% to 80% of all errors in
software. This is consistent with what Panko (1999) found in a spreadsheet logic inspection experiment using groups of three
subjects.
The Fagan Method
The basic methodology of software code inspection was laid down by Fagan (1976), and it still is the main methodology for
code inspection today. In this methodology, there are four phases.
Ø Initial Meeting. The process begins with an introductory meeting for the team. At this meeting, the code developer
describes the requirements of the module and walks the team through the code.
Ø Individual Inspection. After the meeting, the team members inspect the module individually, looking for errors.
There normally is a time limit for this. Often, this time limit is about two hours.
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Ø Concluding Meeting. After the team members have finished their individual inspections, the team holds a
concluding meeting at which the team members go over the errors discovered by the individual members and
perhaps look for additional errors. They attempt to develop a consensus about which defect reports are real and to
rate the severity of defects. They do not attempt to fix the errors, however.
Ø Reporting. One tenet of code inspection is that results should be summarized and reported. Reporting results is
critical for learning. Most of what we know about software error rates comes from code inspection reports.
Team Inspection
Why does code inspection use teams rather than individual inspectors? The answer is that research across many cognitive
activities has shown that individuals almost never catch all errors (Panko 2006a). This is not due to sloppiness but to
limitations in the human cognitive mechanism. Even for finding spelling errors, humans only catch 75% to 90% of all errors
(Panko 2006a). For more complex errors, the error detection rate is much lower. Limited error detection ability is simply a
fact of human cognition.
Experiments in software code inspection have shown that individual software code inspectors only catch about 40% of all
defects (Johnson & Tjahjono 1997, Myers 1978). In industrial settings, even an increase in team size from three to four can
make a notable difference (Weller 1993)
In turn, three laboratory experiments have looked at spreadsheet logic inspection. In two studies by Galletta, et al. (1993,
1997) subjects found about half of the seeded errors in a spreadsheet. In the first study, certified public accountants found
more errors than people without CPAs, but the gain was small. Experienced spreadsheet developers worked faster than
subjects without spreadsheet development experience, but they found almost exactly the same percentage of errors.
Panko (1999) adopted the Fagan (1976) methodology to three-person spreadsheet logic inspections. On average, the
individuals in his study found 63% of the seeded errors. In the concluding meeting, teams reported 83% of the errors. This
was a modest increase, but the gain came primarily from the most-difficult-to-detect errors. This study used a simple
spreadsheet based derived from the Galletta et al. (1993) task. In more complex spreadsheets, individual and group detection
rates probably will be lower.
Need to Inspect Modules
One tenet of code inspection methodology is to limit the sizes of the modules being tested. Quite simply, if modules are too
long, detection yields fall sharply (Barnard & Price 1994). The same is likely to be true in spreadsheet logic inspection, but
this needs to be explored in experiments to see if it is indeed true and, if so, how long modules should be.
Speed Hurts
Another tenet of code inspection is the need to inspect slowly. When the speed of inspection increases, yields fall. This has
been strongly documented in code inspections of real-world programs (Basili & Perricone 1993, Russell 1991, and Weller
1993).
Human cognition, including error detection, cannot be rushed without disastrous results. As noted earlier, the subjects in the
Panko (1999) logic inspection study detected 63% of all errors. They were required to work for 45 minutes, and if they
wanted to finish early, they were not allowed to do so. Although the paper did not report it, subjects in another group were
allowed to finish when they felt that they had done all they could. These subjects took 32 minutes on average. On average,
they only found 52% of the errors.
Management Issues
Logic inspection may be the best choice for spreadsheet testing, but it raises serious management problems. First, who will be
in charge of spreadsheet testing (and development) policy? The IT departments barely know that spreadsheets exist and do
not have the organizational power to impose discipline on end user developers. In Sarbanes–Oxley compliance, the CFO
usually has the power to impose discipline on staff members in financial reporting, but spreadsheet development is done in
many parts of the organization.
End user developers, furthermore, only build spreadsheets as part of their job responsibilities. Consequently, they probably
will not be responsive to time-consuming professional development. More importantly, they have traditionally had broad
discretion in their work. Getting them to develop spreadsheets in a disciplined way in the face of this traditional discretion is
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likely to be difficult in itself. Getting them to participate in logic inspection teams will be far more difficult given their
traditional freedom and the fact that code inspection usually is painfully unpleasant to do.
CONCLUSION
Given the extensive use of spreadsheets in financial reporting, extensive data on spreadsheet error rates, and the paucity of
spreadsheet development and maintenance controls in organizations, it is doubtful that many firms today can plausibly assess
their financial reporting systems as free of material weaknesses.
One control that is almost certainly necessary for spreadsheets is testing. In software development, which has the same error
rates as spreadsheet development, 30% to 40% of a project’s resources must be spent on testing to produce small final error
rates. The same is likely to be true in well-controlled spreadsheet development. Consequently, this paper focused on
spreadsheet testing. More specifically, it focused on logic inspection, which, the paper argued, is likely to be the most fruitful
form of testing in end user development. It discussed, based on software development experience, how the Fagan (1976)
methodology for software code inspection is likely to be extensible to spreadsheet testing. It noted that the key elements of
software code inspection— such as team inspection rather than individual inspection, the inspection of limited-size modules,
and the avoidance of rushed inspection— are likely to be needed in spreadsheet logic inspection. It also noted that empirical
research will need to be done to determine how to do logic inspection most effectively for spreadsheets.
At the same time, developing logic inspection methodologies is only one step in controlling spreadsheet development. Other
forms of testing also need to be considered, especially execution testing. Other systems development life cycle controls also
need to be extended to work with spreadsheet development. Simplistic interpolation of software controls is not likely to be
possible because spreadsheets have unique problems, such as the tendency of users to type numbers into formula cells during
data entry. This ruins the spreadsheet for later use.
One aspect of spreadsheet control that this paper did not consider at all was spreadsheet security. Error reduction can only
protect spreadsheets from innocent mistakes. However, spreadsheets also need to be protected from attacks, including fraud
to  steal  money  or  to  cover  up  problems.  This  is  not  just  a  theoretical  concern.  Most  notably,  John  Rusnak  perpetrated  a
massive fraud at Allfirst Bank to cover up his currency trading losses (BBC 2002). Rusnak implemented this fraud primarily
through spreadsheet manipulation. This fraud went on for several years, ending in 2002 with a cumulative loss of $691
million. Fortunately, several companies have developed spreadsheet security control software in response to the 21 CFR 11
rules  imposed on the  pharmaceuticals  industry  by  the  U.  S.  Food and Drug Administration  to  prevent  the  manipulation  of
drug test results. These technologies are promising for use in financial spreadsheet development.
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